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Comments
Medical Self-Determination: A Call for Uniformity
There is an appointed time for everything, and a time for every affair under
the heaven. A time to be born and a time to die.
Ecclesiastes 3:12-2.
I. INTRODUCTION
What is death? Medical technology has clouded the answer to
this once seemingly simple question.' Years ago there were no mir-
acle drugs to promote healing and no ingenious devices to prolong
life when the body's natural forces failed. Families did not have to
make decisions whether to withdraw life support systems from a
hopelessly ill relative. In modern times medical science has made it
possible for a person to be held at the threshold of death for an
indeterminate period of time.2 Through the use of extraordinary
mechanical devices and other artificial means it has become possi-
ble to sustain the body's vital functions.3 The procedures employed
1. Historically death has been defined as the cessation of the heart and respiratory
functions. However, modern statutes define death "as an individual who has sustained ei-
ther (1) irreversible cessation of the circulatory and respiratory functions or (2) irreversible
cessation of all functions of the entire brain including the brain stem." Barber v State of
California, 195 Cal Rptr 484, 487, 147 Cal App 3d 1006, 1013 (1983); discussed in text page
94-5.
2. John F Kennedy Memorial Hospital, Inc. v Bludworth, 452 S2d 921, 923 (Fla
1984).
3. Bludworth, 452 S2d at 923. Francis Landy was admitted to the hospital in April
and within two days had stopped breathing. Landy was placed on a mechanical ventilator, a
tube was placed in his trachea, and an artificial support system breathed for him. Id at 922.
See also, Kelly C. Mulholland, Protecting the Right to Die: The Patient Self-Determina-
tion Act of 1990, 28 Harv J. on Legis 609 (1991) stating "Technological improvements in
medical care increasingly blur the distinction between life and death. The dying process is
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by the medical profession in cases of the terminally ill have at
times been classified as techniques in prolonging the aging process,
rather than a means of continuing life."
Eighty percent of the estimated two million deaths that occur
each year are in hospitals or long term care facilities.5 Seventy per-
cent of these deaths occur after a decision has been made to forego
life sustaining treatment.6 Further, it has been noted that the ma-
jority of people in this country will at some point during their life-
time be unable to participate in medical treatment decisions af-
fecting their own health care.7 Unwanted medical procedures may
make a patient and his family prisoners of medical technology,
thereby subjecting them to tremendous financial and emotional
suffering."
Death has become a matter of choice. "Medical technology has
created a twilight zone of suspended animation where death com-
mences, while life, in some form, continues." Increasingly, patients
are asserting their right to refuse medical treatment, especially
once diagnosed with a terminal illness. Unfortunately, the law sur-
rounding the making of such choices is confusing. This comment
addresses: (1) the origin and case law surrounding the right to
make personal medical decisions ("self-determination"); (2) the
federal legislative response to the right of Self-Determination (The
Patient Self-Determination Act of 1990); (3) existing state statu-
tory law; and (4) a model statute aimed at lessening the conflicting
and confusing law surrounding patient self-determination.
now extended through the use of artificial, extraordinary, extreme, or radical medical or
surgical procedures." Mulholland, Protecting the Right to Die, 28 Harv J on Leg at 611.
4. Bludworth, 452 S2d at 923.
5. Cruzan v Director, Missouri Department of Health, 497 US 261, 110 SCt 2841,
2864 (1990) (Brennan dissenting), citing President's Commission for the Study of Ethical
Problems in Medicine and Biomedical and Behavioral Research, Deciding to forgo Life Sus-
taining Treatment 15 M.1 and 17-18 (1983). Cruzan, 110 SCt at 2864 n 3.
6. Cruzan, 110 SCt at 2864.
7. Fred H. Cole and Barbara A. Gill, The Patient Self-Determination Act: Imple-
mentation Issues and Opportunities, 6 The Health Lawyer 1 (Spring 1992).
8. Mulholland, 28 Harv J on Leg at 609 (cited in note 3).
9. Rasmussen v Fleming, 154 Ariz 200, 741 P2d 667, 678. (1988). Here a patient in
an incurable and irreversible condition was being sustained through a nasal gastric tube
which had been in place for 2 1/2 years. The court granted the guardian's petition to have
life support withdrawn. Fleming, 741 P2d at 668.
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II. ORIGIN AND CASE LAW OF SELF-DETERMINATION
A. Foundation of the Right of Self-Determination
Patients have a general right to refuse medical treatment. His-
torically the states have grounded this right on the common law
doctrine of informed consent and/or the constitutional right of pri-
vacy.10 The doctrine of informed consent is recognized as being
firmly rooted in American tort law." This doctrine requires a phy-
sician to inform a patient of the risks involved with medical treat-
ment.12 The patient must understand these risks and freely con-
sent prior to the administration of such treatment." The logical
corollary of the doctrine of informed consent is that a patient gen-
erally possesses the right not to consent: the right to refuse medi-
cal treatment."'
The constitutional right of privacy has also been used by state
courts to justify a patient's right to refuse medical treatment. 5
The right of privacy guaranteed in the federal Constitution is said
to arise from the penumbra of specific rights contained in the
10. See Cruzan, 110 SCt at 2847. See also Fleming, 741 P2d at 686.
11. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 892 A, 892 B (1977); See also Cruzan, 110 SCt
at 2846 stating "No right is held more sacred, or is more carefully guarded, by the common
law, than the right of every individual to the possession and control of his own person, free
from all restraint or interference of others, unless by clear and unquestionable authority of
Law." Id. citing Union Pacific R Co v Botsford, 141 US 250, 251, 11 SCt 1000, 1001, 35 LEd
734 (1891).
12. Mulholland, 28 Harv J on Leg at 610-11 (cited in note 3).
See also Schloendorff v Society of New York Hospital, 211 NY 125, 129, 105 NE 92, 93
(1914) when Judge Cardozzo stated: "Every human being of adult years and sound mind has
a right to determine what shall be done with his own body; and a surgeon who performs an
operation without his patient's consent commits an assault for which he is liable for in dam-
ages." Schloendorff, 105 NE at 93, and Cruzan, 110 SCt at 2846-7.
13. Mulholland, 28 Harv J on Leg at 610-11 (cited in note 3).
14. Cruzan, 110 SCt at 2847.
See also Delio v Westchester County Medical Center, 516 NYS2d 677, 129 A2d 1 (1987)
where the court held the right of self determination grounded in the common law right of
informed consent forms the foundation for a competent adult the right to refuse life sus-
taining treatment even if the effect is to hasten death. Delio, 129 A2d at 14.
Also, In re Gardner, 534 A2d 947 holding Maine's common law of informed consent recog-
nizes the personal right of any individual to refuse life sustaining treatment. Gardner, 534
A2d at 951.
15. See In re Quinlan, 70 NJ 10, 355 A2d 647 (1976), cert denied, 429 US 922 (1976).
See also Fleming, 741 P2d at 682 holding the right to refuse medical treatment is a per-
sonal right sufficiently fundamental or implicit in ordered liberty to fall within the constitu-
tionally protected zone of privacy. Id.
Also, Superintendent of Belchertown State School v Saikewicz, 373 Mass 728, 370 NE2d
417 (1977) holding the right of privacy encompasses the right of a patient to preserve his or
her right of privacy against unwanted infringements of bodily integrity. Saikewicz 370 NE
2d 424.
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First, Fourth, Fifth, Ninth, and Fourteenth Amendments.16 The
scope of this implied right is said to be sufficiently broad to encom-
pass a patient's decision to forego medical treatment. "The deci-
sion by the incurably ill to forego medical treatment... is so man-
ifestly a 'fundamental' decision in their lives, that it is virtually
inconceivable that the right of privacy would not apply to it.' 17
The most widely publicized case establishing the right of privacy
as a basis to allow the termination of medical treatment was the
New Jersey case of In Re Quinlan.'8 In Quinlan, Karen Ann Quin-
lan, age 22, suffered severe brain damage leaving her in a "chronic
persistent vegetative state."' 9 Although Ms. Quinlan was unaware
of her surroundings and her breathing was assisted by a respirator
without which doctors believed she would not survive, Ms. Quinlan
did not exhibit the signs of "brain death."20 The New Jersey Su-
preme Court, in a unanimous decision, held that her father as
guardian could exercise Ms. Quinlan's privacy right and authorize
removal of artificial life support systems.2 After Quinlan, however,
most state courts have based the right of self-determination solely
on the common law right of informed consent or on both the com-
mon law doctrine and the right of privacy.2
Ordinarily, the right of self-determination is based upon the
competency of a patient to assert the right to refuse medical treat-
ment. Thus, traditionally only the person whose common law or
constitutional rights are at issue may assert them. 23 As Quinlan
illustrates, however, the rights of informed consent and privacy are
not lost when a patient becomes incompetent. The states are all in
agreement that an incompetent patient is entitled to the same
rights and choices regarding medical self-determination that a
competent patient is entitled. Recognizing that human dignity ex-
tends to both the competent and incompetent, the courts have ex-
tended the right of privacy and the common law right of self- de-
16. Griswold v Connecticut, 381 US 479, 484, 85 SCt 323, 13 LEd 2d 339 (1965).
17. Eichner v Dillion, 426 NYS2d 517, 73 AD2d 431 (1980). Here the appeal con-
cerned the right of a terminally ill patient in a comatose and vegetative state to have life
sustaining measures discontinued. Dillion, 73 AD2d at 459.
18. 70 NJ 10, 355 A2d 647 (1976), cert denied 429 US 922 (1976).
19. Quinlan, 355 A2d at 654.
20. Id at 654-5. Experts testified that Ms Quinlan did have some brain stem function,
although, not sufficient to sustain breathing. Id.
21. Id at 664.
22. Cruzan, 110 SCt at 2847 citing L. Tribe, American Constitutional Law § 15-11 p
1365 (2d ed 1988). Id.
23. Fleming, 741 P2d at 685.
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termination to the incompetent patient.24
B. State Interests v The Individual's Right
The right to refuse medical treatment, although extended to all
persons, is not absolute. The right of the patient must be weighed
against certain state interests. Generally the interests asserted are:
(1) the preservation of life; (2) the protection of innocent third
persons; (3) the prevention of suicide; and (4) the maintenance of
the integrity of the medical profession.2 These interests have at
times been strong enough to outweigh the patient's right of self
determination. 6 In a leading case, In re President & Directors of
Georgetown College, Inc.,2 7 a hospital sought permission to per-
form a blood transfusion to save a patient's life despite the pa-
tient's unwillingness based upon religious beliefs.28 The court held
that it had the power to allow the transfusion s.2  The court justified
its decision based on the state's parens patriae interest in protect-
ing the patient's minor child from abandonment by the parent.30
The state's interests are strongest when the affliction is curable
and dwindles as the prognosis grows dimmer.31 Often no states' in-
24. See Brophy v New England Sima Hospital, Inc., 497 NE2d 626 (1986), where a
once healthy robust male was left in a vegetative state following an aneurism rupturing in
his brain. A petition was filed by his spouse to have the G-tube supplying nutrition either
clamped or removed. Brophy, 497 NE2d at 628-34.
See also John F Kennedy Memorial Hospital v Bludworth, 452 S2d 921, (Fla 1984) hold-
ing "this right of the terminally ill patients should not be lost when they suffer irreversible
brain damage, become comatose and are no longer able to express their wishes. Blud-
worth, 452 So2d at 924.
25. Cruzan, 110 SCt at 2847-8; Fleming, 741 P2d at 683; In re Colyer, 99 Wash2d
114, 660 P2d 738, 743 (1983); Saikewicz 370 NE2d at 427.
26. See In re Conroy, 98 NJ 321, 486 A2d 1209 (1985) holding the states interest in
preserving life is the most significant interest and embraces the life of a particular individ-
ual as well as preserving the sanctity of all life. Conroy, 486 A2d at 1223.
See also In re Caulk, 125 NH 226, 480 A2d 93 (1984) where the court held states could
force feed a prisoner who was starving himself to death because he preferred death to life
imprisonment.
Also, Fleming, 741 P2d at 684 where the court recognized the medical profession itself
now recognizes that it is no longer obligated to provide medical treatment in all situations
citing the American Medical Association's Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs. Id.
27. 118 US App DC 80, 331 F2d 1000, Cert denied, 377 US 978, 84 Sct 1883 (1964).
28. Georgetown, 331 F2d at 1002.
29. Id at 1008.
30. Id.
31. Quinlan, 335 A2d at 664.
See also Brophy, 497 NE2d at 635 stating states interest is very high when human life can
be saved since affection is curable.
Also, Saikewicz, 370 NE2d 425-6.
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terests will outweigh the individual's right of self determination,
even at the risk of death. For example, in Lane v Candura2 a
Massachusetts appellate court recognized a competent person's
right to refuse amputation of a gangrenous leg." Case law holding
otherwise has either involved the interest of protecting innocent
third persons or has concerned the competency of the patient to
make a rational and considered choice.
3 4
C. Case Law-A State of Confusion
The case law surrounding the patient's right of self-determina-
tion has created a confusing array of judicial decisions. The publi-
cized judicial decisions granting the patient the right to refuse life-
saving treatment offers health care providers with little guidance
as to whether they can legally withhold or discontinue treatment.3 3
A physician fearing criminal or civil liability may refuse to carry
out a patient's recognized right of self-determination. This inter-
ference with a patient's right may escalate as a patient becomes
unable to personally assert his wishes.
The decision to forego medical treatment in the case of an in-
competent patient does not often involve court intervention. 6 The
frequently practiced procedure is for the physician and the incom-
petent patient's family to confer and make treatment decisions
concerning the patient.37 In some instances, however, the state or
other interested parties assert an interest, thus forcing the court to
make decisions that are laced with moral and ethical concerns in-
volving the delicate matters of life saving or sustaining treatment
32. 6 Mass App Ct 377, 376 NE2d 1232 (1978).
33. Candura, 376 NE2d at 1235-6. See also In re Osborne, 294 A2d 372 (DC 1972)
(upholding patient's right to refuse life-saving blood transfusion) and In re Yetter, 62 Pa
D&C 2d 619 (1973) (upholding patient's right to refuse biopsy and removal of possible
breast cancer.)
34. Cruzan, 110 SCt at 2848 citing In re Conroy, 98 NJ 321 at 54, 486 A2d 1209 at
1225 (1985).
35. Linda Flewellen Gould, Right to Die Legislation: The Effect on Physicians' Lia-
bility, 39 Mercer L Rev 517 (1988), stating "well publicized judicial decisions granting pa-
tients the right to refuse life sustaining treatment provide little guidance to physicians
struggling with the issue of whether they can legally discontinue treatment in specific situa-
tions." Gould, 39 Mercer L Rev at 523.
36. Mulholland, 28 Harv J on Leg at 612 (cited in note 3).
See also Conroy, 486 A2d at 1220-1, stating many health care decisions occur each day
without the use of legal help.
37. Mulholland, 28 Harv J on Legis at 612 (cited in note 3).
See also Conroy, 486 A2d at 1220-1.
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for the patient.3 8
Courts vary in their approach to ascertain the patient's intent,
demonstrating both similarity and diversity in their methods.3 9
Most courts search for evidence of the incompetent's clearly stated
desires.4" These desires may be evidenced by written advanced di-
rectives.' 1 Oral statements made by the party while competent
may also be given great weight."' In the absence of such evidence,
the courts will use tests that utilize subjective and/or objective
evidence.'3
The substitute judgment test, subjective in nature, places a bur-
den on a surrogate decision maker. Under this approach the court
normally allows family members to act as the surrogate decision
maker. Experience indicates that the family, due to its special
bonds and grasp of the incompetent patient's approach to life, is
best qualified to express the desires of the patient." The surrogate
must convince the courts that his or her choice in medical treat-
ment reflects the decision the incompetent patient would make if
competent and making his or her own decision under the circum-
stances.' 5 The focus is centered upon the individual. Accordingly,
what the majority of people might consider to be a prudent and
wise medical decision making is not controlling under the substi-
tute judgment approach.' 6
38. Id.
See for example: Bludworth, 452 S2d at 922-23 where upon request to terminate life sup-
port the hospital fearing liability filed for declaratory relief to continue or discontinue
treatment.
See also: Candura, 376 NE2d 1232, where the patient's daughter petitioned to have her 77
year old mother declared incompetent and herself appointed guardian so consent could be
given to have a gangrenous leg amputated. Candura, 376 NE2d at 1233).
39. Cruzan, 110 SCt at 2851.
See also Mulholland, 28 Harv J on Legis at 612 (cited in note 3).
40. Mulholland, 28 Harv J on Legis at 612 (cited in note 3).
See also Conroy, 486 A2d at 1229.
41. Fleming, 741 P2d at 689 n 21.
See also Conroy, 486 A2d at 1229.
42. Fleming, 741 P2d at 689.
See also Mulholland, 28 Harv J on Legis at 612 (cited in note 3), citing In re Gardner, 534
A2d 947 (1987). Also, Conroy, 486 A2d at 1229.
43. Fleming, 741 P2d at 688.
44. Quinlan, 355 A2d at 664.
See also, In re Jobes, 108 NJ 394, 529 A2d 434 (1987) holding family members are best
qualified to make substituted judgements for incompetent patients. Jobes, 529 A2d at 451.
45. Id at 688-9.
See also Saikewicz, 370 NE2d at 431, holding must ascertain the incompetent person's
actual interest and preferences.
46. Saikewicz, 370 NE2d at 427.
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A second test utilized by the courts is an objective test known as
the best interest test. Under this approach the court will consider
factors such as: (1) the degree, duration, and consistency of pain;
(2) the maturity of the patient; (3) the patient's life expectancy; (4)
the prognosis; (5) the patient's physical and cognitive functions;
(6) the nature of the treatment and degree of humiliation associ-
ated with such treatment; and (7) the alternative treatments avail-
able. "' After examining such evidence the court will then make a
decision and base its conclusion on the best interest of the patient.
This test seems most appropriate when the patient has never been
competent, such as in the case of a minor or a mentally handi-
capped person."8 In utilizing this test the court must be cautious
not to base its decision on an assessment of the individual's per-
sonal worth or value to society. 9
One difficulty with such tests is that the results of these tests are
often uncertain due to the complexities and ambiguities of the
facts surrounding the individual circumstances of the case.50 Fur-
ther uncertainties are created since a court may use a single test or
a combination of these tests to arrive at a decision. 1 Courts have
also been criticized in their application of a test that seems ill
suited for the facts of a particular case.52 The unpredictable results
create confusion.for the patient and health care provider relying on
the law.
In some jurisdictions the termination of life-sustaining devices
may result in criminal liability. Although no convictions for partic-
ipating in such decisions have been recorded, in Barber v Califor-
47. Fleming, 741 P2d at 689.
See also, Mulholland, 28 Harv J on Legis at 613 (cited in note 3). Also, Barber, 195 Cal
Rptr at 493. And, Conroy, 486 A2d at 1232.
48. See Fleming, 741 P2d at 668 stating the substitute judgement test is best suited
when the patient has manifested an intent while competent. Id. citing Foody 40 Conn Sup
at 139-40, 482 A2d at 721.
See also Conroy, 486 A2d at 1231.
49. See Cruzan, 110 SCt at 2853 where the Court held a state may properly decline
to make judgements about life. Id;
See also, Brophy, 497 NE2d at 635 holding the trial judge was correct by not pronouncing
judgement that Brophy's life is not worth preserving. "We do not approve of an analysis
• . . which focuses on the quality of Brophy's life." Id. Also, Conroy, 486 A2d at 1232-3.
50. Mulholland, 28 Harv J on Legis at 613. ,
51. Id. For example, see Conroy, 486 A2d at 1231-2 stating, this court recognizes that
the right of self-determination can be exercised under either the substitute judgement or
best interest tests.
52. See Fleming, 741 P2d at 689 pointing out the criticisms of using the substitute
judgement test when patient was never competent. Id at 689 n 22. See also, Mulholland, 28
Harv J on Leg at 613 (cited in note 3).
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nia" two doctors were indicted for the removal of life-sustaining
devices.5' The doctors removed life support from Clarence Herbert
at the request of his family.5 5 Mr. Herbert was in a permanent
coma and had informed his family of his desire not to be kept alive
through the use of "heroic" measures. 6 The California appellate
court found the doctors were not criminally negligent for with-
drawing the devices using a subjective test to enforce Mr. Her-
bert's right of self determination. 7 Notwithstanding the results in
Barber, the physicians' indictment creates apprehension in any
doctor asked to discontinue medical treatment.
An additional obstacle an individual may .encounter in asserting
the right of self-determination results from the diversity of proce-
dural requirements among the various jurisdictions. The two lead-
ing cases often cited to demonstrate this diversion are In re Quin-
lan and Superintendent of Belchertown State School v Saikewicz.
The decision rendered in Saikewicz is illustrative of a jurisdiction
that requires a court order before life-sustaining procedures may
be withheld or withdrawn from an incompetent patient: The
Saikewicz court stated:
We take a dim view of any attempt to shift the ultimate decision-making
responsibility away from the duly established courts of proper jurisdiction
to any committee, panel or group, ad hoc or permanent. . . We do not view
the judicial resolution of this most difficult and awesome question-whether
potentially life-prolonging treatment should be withheld from a person in-
capable of making his own decision-as constituting a "gratuitous encroach-
ment" on the domain of medical expertise. Rather, such questions of life
and death seem to us to require the process of detached but passionate in-
vestigation and decision that forms the ideal on which the judicial branch of
government was created. Achieving this ideal is our responsibility and that
of the lower court, and is not to be entrusted to any other group purporting
to represent the "morality and conscience of our society," no matter how
highly motivated or impressively constituted.58
Along these lines, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court in-
dicated that a court must consider a variety of circumstances in
determining whether a court order is necessary prior to withhold-
ing medical treatment from a patient.5 9 The court further provided
53. 147 Cal App 3d 1006, 195 Cal Rptr 484 (1983).
54. Barber, 195 Cal RPtr 484.
55. Id at 486.
56. Id at 493.
57. Id at 490-1.
58. Saikewicz, 470 NE2d at 434-5.
59. In re Spring, 380 Mass 629, 405 NE2d 115, 120 (1980), stating the extent of im-
pairment, whether the patient is in the custody of a state institution, the prognosis with and
1992
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that once a court order is sought, the probate court has the ulti-
mate responsibility to determine whether the physician can with-
hold or withdraw life-sustaining devices from an incompetent pa-
tient.6 0 Under such circumstances a physician threatened with
criminal or civil liability will ultimately seek a court order before
acting to carry out the desires of a patient seeking to have life sus-
taining devices withdrawn.
The Quinlan case demonstrates the other end of the spectrum
where the court's role is limited. In Quinlan the court attempted
to establish a procedure for determining whether a physician
should disconnect life-sustaining devices. The Quinlan court main-
tained that as a general practice such decisions "should be con-
trolled within the patient-doctor-family relationship."6 ' In so hold-
ing, the court reasoned that a need to apply to a court to confirm
such decisions would not only be time consuming, but an encroach-
ment upon the medical profession's field of competence.62 Further,
the Quinlan court advocated the establishment of a hospital ethics
committee to assist in the decision making to protect against less
than trustworthy motives by the surrogate decision maker.
3
Ethical concerns of health care providers present another obsta-
cle in the execution of the right of self-determination. The profes-
sional training of a physician focuses on the preservation of life
and the curing of disease; therefore, many health care providers
strongly oppose the termination of life-sustaining treatment.6 4
Early cases recognized and supported such a medical position. One
such case was In re President & Directors of Georgetown College65
where a mother could not refuse a blood transfusion to prevent her
own death.6 The court based its decision, inter alia, on the duty of
the medical profession to effectively treat any patient committed
to its care.6 7 Therefore, some providers may resist efforts to with-
without treatment, possible side effects ...all must be considered to determine if a court
order is necessary. Spring, 405 NE2d at 120-21.
60. Id at 122. See also Gould, 39 Mercer L Rev at 525-26 (cited in note 35).
61. Quinlan, 355 A2d at 669.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Mulholland, 28 Harv J on Legis at 614-15 (cited in note 3).
65. 118 US App DC 80, 331 F2d 1060 cert denied, 377 US 978, 84 Sct 1883 (1964).
66. Georgetown College, Inc., 331 F2d at 1001-2.
67. Id at 1009. See also, John F Kennedy Memorial Hospital v Heston, 58 NJ 576,
279 A2d 670 (1971), where a 22 year old unmarried female was severely injured in an auto
accident, the court allowed a blood transfusion to prevent death. Heston, 279 A2d at 670-1.
The court stated hospitals exist to aid the sick, the providers are consecrated to preserve
life. The hospital and staff should be permitted to preserve their function. Id at 673.
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hold or withdraw life-sustaining treatment and may require a court
order before they respond.
III. THE SUPREME COURT AND SELF-DETERMINATION
The United States Supreme Court first addressed the issue of an
incompetent patient's "right-to-die" in the landmark case of
Cruzan v Director, Missouri Department of Health.6 8 According to
one commentator, the fifty one page decision with three majority
and two dissenting opinions should be "the basis for the legal pro-
fession, health care providers and legislators focusing upon a vari-
ety of legal and ethical issues concerning the use or nonuse of liv-
ing wills or advanced health care directives." 69 The facts of the
Cruzan case are not atypical of thousands of persons involved in
accidents each year.70 Nancy Cruzan had suffered multiple trauma,
anoxia (lack of oxygen), and irreparable and irreversible brain
damage as a result of an automobile accident.71 She lingered in a
''persistent vegetative state" for six years with her existence being
sustained by nutrients and fluids mechanically pumped through a
gastrostomy tube. surgically implanted in her stomach." After it
became apparent that Ms. Cruzan's condition would not improve,
her parents and co-guardians requested the removal of life sus-
taining devices.7 3 When hospital employees refused to honor their
request, the parents sought a court order to implement their re-
quest.7' The trial court found Ms. Cruzan had a fundamental right
under both the federal and state constitutions to the withdrawal of
"death prolonging procedures" and authorized the termination of
treatment."1
The Missouri Supreme Court reversed the trial court and or-
dered the hospital to continue treatment.76 The Missouri court
found that a patient in Ms. Cruzan's condition had a common law
right of self-determination, but under the facts of this particular
68. 497 US 261, 110 SCt 2841, (1990).
69. Jerome Apfel, Your Pennsylvania Living Will: Don't Leave Home Without it in
1991, 62 Jan Pa B A Q 19 (Jan 1991).
70. Experts estimate that approximately 10,000 Americans currently exist in a per-
sistent vegetative state. Cole and Gill, 6 Health Lawyer 1 (Spring 1992) (cited in note 7).
71. Cruzan, 110 SCt at 2845.







case the evidence was not sufficient to terminate the treatment."'
The court held that the testimony of Ms. Cruzan's parents and of
Ms. Cruzan's roommate did not amount to the clear and convinc-
ing evidence necessary to indicate the desires of the incompetent
patient.
The United States Supreme Court, in an opinion written by Jus-
tice Rehnquist, affirmed the Missouri Supreme Court's decision."9
Justice Rehnquist wrote that the Fourteenth Amendment provides
that no state shall deprive any person of life, liberty, or property
without due process of the law and the right to refuse medical
treatment is best analyzed under this Amendment.8" According to
the Cruzan Court, the administering of medical treatment without
a patient's consent would be a substantial interference with one's
liberty interest.81 However, in cases involving an incompetent pa-
tient, the state has a substantial interest in the sustaining of life
and may protect this interest by the imposition of heightened evi-
dentiary requirements.82 In addition, the state may properly de-
cline to make judgments about the quality of life and simply assert
an unqualified interest in the preservation of life.83
In affirming the Missouri court's decision, the Supreme Court
recognized that there would be situations where family members
might not be acting to protect the patient and explained that a
state is entitled to guard against these potential abuses. " Specifi-
cally, Justice Rehnquist wrote that the due process clause does not
require a state to accept the "substitute judgment" of close family
members in the absence of substantial proof that their views re-
flect the views of the patient.8 5 The due process clause does not
require the state to rest judgment on these matters with anyone
but the patient.86 The Supreme Court thus concluded it was not
erroneous for the Missouri Supreme Court to find that the testi-
mony adduced at trial did not meet the allowable clear and con-
77. Id.
78. Id at 2845. Ms. Cruzan's parents and her roommate testified that their conversa-
tions with Ms. Cruzan revealed she did not wish to be sustained by mechanical devices. Id.
79. Id at 2841.
80. Id at 2852 n 7.
81. Id.
82. Id at 2852-3.
83. Id at 2853.
84. Id.




vincing evidence standard set by the state court. 87
After the Cruzan decision it would appear that a state court or
legislature may enact laws or procedural rules less burdensome
than did Missouri." The Cruzan Court acknowledged that the
Missouri standard was a most restrictive law, but right to die is-
sues (subject to due process) should be decided pursuant to state
law.89 In light of the Cruzan holdings one is hard pressed to imag-
ine what evidence would have to be produced to satisfy a court in a
state such as Missouri requiring clear and convincing evidence.90
What is more convincing than conversations with family members
and friends expressing one's desire not to have one's life sustained
by mechanical means?
The Cruzan court made it clear that its decision did not decide
the issue of whether a state must give effect to advanced directives
expressly made by the patient while competent. " However, a
forceful concurring opinion by Justice O'Conner may indicate that
such advanced directives are constitutionally protected. O'Conner
stated "[t]oday's decision . .. does not preclude a future determi-
nation that the Constitution requires the states to implement the
decisions of a patient's duly appointed surrogate." 92
IV. STATUTORY LAW AND THE RIGHT OF SELF-DETERMINATION
A. Types of State Statutory Law
During the last ten years states have enacted three different
types of legislation to deal with the health care of the incompetent
patient. The first of these statutes is best known as the "Living
Will" or "Health Care Directive" acts. Currently the District of
Columbia and all but a few states have such legislation in place. 3
This legislation provides adults, while competent, the opportunity
to make and execute a writing expressing the patient's desires to
87. Id at 2855-6.
88. Apfel, 62 Jan Pa B A Q at 20 (cited in note 69).
89. Id at 20.
90. Id.
91. Cruzan, 110 SCt at 2856 n 12.
92. Cruzan, 110 SCt at 2858 (O'Conner concurring).
93. Cole and Gill, The Patient Self-Determination Act: Implementation, Issues, and
Opportunities, 6 The Health Lawyer at 3 (Spring 1992). Courts in states such as New York
have authorized the use of the living will. Only Massachusetts, Michigan, and Nebraska
have apparently made no such provision for living wills. Id at 3.
See also, Apfel, 62 PA B A Q 19, 21 (Jan 1991) however since such writing Pa has enacted
a living will statute (cited in note 70). Also, George Alexander, Time For a New Law on
Health Care Advance Directives, 42 Hasting L J 755 (1991).
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receive or decline and/or continue or discontinue medical treat-
ment.9 4 The directives are triggered when the patient becomes in-
competent and terminally ill. 9 5 The statutes usually contain quite
specific definitions with regard to who is a qualified patient and
under what situations a patient is considered terminally ill.
The second type of legislation regarding the medical care of a
patient who has become incompetent is known as the medical or
health care durable power of attorney.9 6 Under this type of legisla-
tion a patient, while competent, may appoint an agent to make
appropriate decisions for the patient in the event the patient be-
comes incompetent.9 7 The power of the attorney-in-fact is limited
to the power expressly granted in the properly executed document
as well as the limits set by the enabling statute.98 Currently the
District of Columbia and all but seven states provide power of at-
torney statutes specific for health care decisions.99
The final type of legislation applicable to this area is known gen-
erally as the "family consent" laws. 100 Under these provisions a
surrogate, proxy, or guardian is authorized to make "right-to-die"
decisions in the absence of a living will, health care directive or a
valid durable medical power of attorney.10 1 Typically these statutes
establish a priority list of decision makers which usually includes
the spouse, parents, adult child, etc. 02 The statutes differ by state
as to whether court approval is necessary to carry out the decisions
made by such surrogates. 1'0
94. Gill, 6 The Health Lawyer at 3.
95. Id.
96. Cole and Gill, 6 The Health Lawyer at 4 (Spring 1992) (cited in note 7).
See also, Apfel, 62 PA B A Q at 21 (cited in note 70). Also, George Alexander, 42 Hasting
L J 755 (1991) (cited in note 94).
97. Cole and Gill, 6 The Health Lawyer at 4, All states and DC provide for general
powers of attorney, also DC and all but 7 states (Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Hawaii, Mary-




100. Cole and Gill, 6 The Health Lawyer at 4 (Spring 1992) (cited in note 7).
See also, Apfel, 62 PA B A Q at 21 (cited in note 70). Also, Alexander, 42 Hasting L J 755
(1991) (cited in note 94).
101. Gill, 6 The Health Lawyer at 4 (cited in note 7).
102. Id.
103. Apfel, 62 Pa B A Q at 21 (cited in note 70).
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B. Federal Legislation: The Patient Self-Determination Act
The Federal Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990104
(hereinafter "Self-Determination Act"), when it became effective
on November 5, 1991, gave new importance to states' statutory law
regarding advanced medical directives. Participation by health
care providers in federal Medicare and Medicaid programs is con-
ditioned upon compliance with this Act. The effects, therefore, will
be felt by most hospitals, nursing facilities, home health agencies,
hospice programs, and health maintenance organizations. 0 5 The
Act requires that the provider both comply with state law in re-
gard to advance directives and disseminate information on pa-
tients' rights to make advanced directives under such state law.106
"Advanced directive" is defined as "a written document, such as a
living will or a durable power of attorney for health care, recog-
nized under state law when an individual is incapacitated.'
07
Under the Act every adult patient must be provided with writ-
ten information regarding:
(1) the individual's rights under state law (whether statutory or as recog-
nized by the state court) to make decisions concerning health care. These
rights include the right to accept or refuse treatment and the right to for-
mulate advanced directives; and
(2) the written policies of the provider regarding the implementation of
such rights. 108
Documentation of the execution or failure to execute an advanced
directive must be maintained in the patient's medical record. 10 9
Discrimination of any type for the execution or the failure to exe-
cute a directive is prohibited by the terms of the Act.110
In addition to the distribution of information required by the
Self-Determination Act, the most significant aspect of the Act is
the requirement that education be provided to the medical staff
and community on issues regarding the right to'die.111 A 1988
AMA survey showed that 56% of those surveyed told family mem-
104. Pub L No 101-508 § 4206, 1990 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News (104 Stat. 1388),
291.
105. Id § 4206 (f) (2) (A-E).
106. Id § 4206 (f) (1) (D) requires the provider comply with state law respecting ad-
vanced directives. § 4206 (f) (1) (A) requires the provider to supply written information to
individuals.
107. Id § 4206 (f) (3).
108. Id § 4206 (f) (1) (A) (i-ii).
109. Id § 4206 (f) (1) (B).
110. Id § 4206 (f) (1) (C).
111. Id § 4206 (f) (1) (E).
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bers of their wishes concerning the use of life sustaining treatment
if they entered an irreversible coma; only 15% completed-a living
will specifying those wishes.112 Research also indicates 85% of Cali-
fornia physicians knew little about advanced directives.113 Simi-
larly, a Colorado study found that 23% of the physicians in that
state were unfamiliar with living wills and 74% were unfamiliar
with durable power of attorney in health care. " 4 In Arkansas, only
38% of physicians were aware of the state's advanced directive
laws." 5 These findings illustrate the need for information and edu-
cation in the area of medical self- determination.
Although the effects of the Self-Determination Act will not be
immediately known, its expected benefit will be to help close the
gap between patients' desires and the implementation of these
desires by medical providers. A patient will have easier access to
information concerning advanced directives which should increase
the execution of such directives."16 The resistance of physicians to
implement a patient's advanced directive due to a fear of malprac-
tice litigation should be alleviated. Educational programs man-
dated by the Act should provide physicians with sufficient knowl-
edge of state law in the area of advanced directives to execute valid
advanced directives without fear of civil or criminal liability.
Additionally, research in this area indicates that only 4% of pa-
tients surveyed inquired about the health care provider's policy on
implementing advanced directives."' An individual, therefore,
could easily find himself in a facility unwilling to implement his
advanced directives. The required publication and distribution of
the provider's policies concerning the execution of advanced direc-
tives should enable a patient to select a health care provider will-
ing to carry out the expressed directive.
C. Ineffectiveness of Present Statutory Law
The federal Self-Determination Act creates no new rights; in-
112. American Medical Association Surveys of Physicians and Public Opinion on
Health Care Issues 29-30 (1985), cited in Cruzan 110 SCt at 2858 n 1.
113. Zinberg, Decisions for the Dying: An Empirical Study of Physician's Responses
to Advance Directives, 13 Vt L Rev 445, 472 (1989), cited in Alexander, Time For A New
Law on Health Care Advanced Directives, 42 Hastings L J at 771 n 88.
114. Mulholland, 28 Harv J on Legis at 622 n 61 (cited in note 3).
115. Id.
116. See also, Cole & Gill, 6 The Health Lawyer 1 (Spring 1992) stating as of 1987
only 9% of Americans have completed living wills; however, more recent studies suggest as
many as 15% may have some form of advanced directive. Id at 4. (cited in note 7).
117. Mulholland, 28 Harv J on Legis at 622 n 59 (cited in note 3).
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stead it defers these issues to the individual states. Unfortunately,
the state statutory law on self-determination, like that of the case
law previously discussed, is ineffective to equitably institute such
rights. The states' statutory laws have been criticized as being am-
biguous and inconsistent."" One commentator has gone so far as to
state that "in states with poorly drafted living will statutes ...
these statutes actually increase a physician's potential liability re-
lating to a decision to terminate life-sustaining procedures." 1 9
The definition of "terminal illness" is one area where these am-
biguities and inconsistencies is evidenced. All living will statutes
provide that the document becomes effective once a patient is di-
agnosed as being terminally ill. Unfortunately, the answer to the
question, "What is meant by terminally ill?" is unclear.
Several states statutes define a "terminal condition" as:
an incurable condition caused by injury, disease, or illness, which regardless
of the application of life-sustaining procedures would, within reasonable
medical judgment, produce death, and where the application of life-sus-
taining procedures serve only to postpone the moment of death of the
patient.110
States such as Pennsylvania and Florida require a more stringent
standard. 1 ' Rather than the mere medical judgment standard,
health care providers in these states must be satisfied within a rea-
sonable degree of medical certainty that without the application of
life-sustaining procedures death will result. 22 On the other hand,
some states will define terminal condition based upon the opinion
of the health care provider."2 3
Such an array of statutory definitions may cause physicians to
118. Gould, 39 Mercer L Rev at 526, 533 (cited in note 35).
See also, Cole and Gill, 6 The Health Lawyer at 4 (Spring 1992) stating 3 factors signifi-
cantly limit the effectiveness: (1) the use of ambiguous language, (2) lack of knowledge as to
the directives existence, and (3) confusion as to the scope of living wills. Id at 4 (cited in
note 7).
119. Gould, 39 Mercer L Rev at 519-20 (cited in note 35).
120. DC Code § 6-2421 (6) (1991).
See also, Utah Code Ann § 75-2-1103(7) (1985); NH Rev Stat Ann § 137-H:2(VI) (1991);
Or Rev Stat § 127.605(6) (1989). and Cal Health and Safety Code § 7186(j) (1991).
121. Fla Stat Ann § 765.03(6) (West 1992; General Assembly of Pennsylvania, Senate
Bill No 3 Session 1991; Printer's No 1326. This bill has recently been signed into law to take
effect immediately.
122. Id.
123. See Conn Gen Stat Ann § 19a-570(3) (West 1992) and Ariz Rev Stat Ann § 36-
3201(6) (West 1991). Under this standard, unlike the medical judgment standard, a physi-




resist the termination of life-sustaining treatment based solely on
their own judgment. Courts are familiar with giving effect to such
terms as reasonable judgment or reasonable certainty, but it is
foreseeable that a physician untrained in such terminology will
turn to the courts before implementing a patient's advanced direc-
tive. 124 More perplexing are those instances of rare disease or ex-
perimental treatments where the medical field itself cannot agree
on what constitutes reasonable treatment under the circumstances.
A second area of criticism of statutory law surrounding the right
of self-determination are those provisions exempting a physician
from civil or criminal liability. Again ambiguities and inconsisten-
cies surround what will qualify a physician for protection. Some
statutes protect the physician if his decision comports with "rea-
sonable medical standards."' 25 Such an ambiguous standard again
invites litigation and thus resistance by the provider to terminate
life-sustaining treatment. Other statutes grant immunity if the
provider acts in accordance with the requirements of the act.126
Here, a provider may act in accordance with the expressed provi-
sions of the act, but may face liability due to a technical flaw. 12 In
such jurisdictions a provider would be wise to consult an attorney
before executing the terms of an advanced directive. The problem
with all this, of course, is that it takes time.
State laws may also pose obstacles for the patient trying to have
advanced directives honored, due to restrictions on the type of
treatment decisions the statute permits to be withdrawn. Several
states, when defining the life-sustaining procedures that may be
withdrawn or withheld from a qualified patient, exclude the ad-
ministration of medication or medical procedure deemed necessary
124. See Havasy v Resnick, A2d , 1992 WL 93085 (Pa Super) (1992), the court
stated a physician is not liable for an error of judgment. . . if a physician employs the skill,
knowledge, and care customarily exercised in his profession he is not liable. Resnick 1992
WL at 10.
See also, Gould, 39 Mercer L Rev at 527-28 n 70-1 (cited in note 35) stating the common
law requires a physician to meet a standard of care determined by the degree of skill, knowl-
edge, and care ordinarily exercised by other members of their profession under similar cir-
cumstances; expert testimony is necessary to establish such a standard (citation omitted).
125. See Ill Ann Stat ch 110 /2 p 707 § 7 (Smith-Hurd 1991); Kan Stat Ann § 65-28,
106 (1990); DC Code § 6-2427(a) (1991); Ala Code § 22-8a-7 (1991).
126. See Ariz Rev Stat Ann § 36-3205(C) West 1991); Or Rev Stat Ann § 127.620 (1-3)
(1991); Fla Stat Ann § 765.10(1) (West 1992).
127. All living will legislation provides specific requirements for an advanced directive
to be valid. Such requirements include such elements as the party be over 10 and the docu-
ment be properly witnessed.
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to provide comfort care or to alleviate pain.128 This exclusion may
make it impossible for a patient to terminate life-prolonging mea-
sures. 129 An advanced directive may not be enforced if a physician
deems undesired treatment necessary for the alleviation of pain. Of
greater concern for a physician fearful of liability is the discontinu-
ation of treatment that an interested party alleges should have
been continued as a means of providing comfort care. Under such
circumstances either the physician, patient, or patient's represen-
tative may be forced to apply to the courts for resolution of such
uncertainties.
V. A CALL FOR UNIFORMITY: A MODEL STATUTE ON ADVANCED
DIRECTIVES
Recognizing the diversity and confusion surrounding the laws re-
garding patient self-determination rights, uniform legislation has
been prepared. The Medical Treatment Decision Act is a model
statute which adequately alleviates the current ambiguities in ex-
isting statutory law and offers consistency throughout the United
States." °0 The model Medical Treatment Decisions Act provides:
Section 1. Definitions
A. Attending Physician. The physician selected by, or assigned to, a pa-_
tient who has primary responsibility for the treatment and care of that
patient.
B. Declaration. A document in writing, voluntarily executed by a patient
in accordance with Section 3.
C. Health Care Provider. Any physician, nurse, hospital or other health
care institution, including all employees of any of these.
D. Life-Sustaining Procedure. Any medical procedure which, in the judg-
ment of the attending physician, would achieve no goal other than prolong-
ing the dying process of a patient in a terminal condition. The term "Life-
Sustaining Procedure" does not include administration of food or fluids or
the performance of any procedure necessary for the comfort of the patient
or to alleviate pain.
E. Qualified Patient. A patient who has executed a Declaration and who is
physically unable to communicate his desires concerning medical treatment
or is INCOMPETENT or unconscious.
F. Terminal Condition. Incurable or irreversible medical condition that in
the opinion of the attending physician and one other physician who has per-
sonally examined the patient: (i) results in there being no reasonable expec-
tation that the patient's condition will improve and (ii) will imminently re-
128. See Kan Stat Ann § 65-28, 102(c) (1990); Or Rev Stat § 127.605(3) (1989); Ariz
Rev Stat Ann § 36-3201(4) (West 1991); DC Code § 6-2421(3) (1991).
129. Gould, 39 Mercer L Rev at 532 (cited in note 35).
130. Gould, 39 Mercer L Rev at 533 (cited in note 35).
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suit in the patient's death.
Section 2. Right to Determine Medical Treatment
A. Every adult person has the right to direct what medical treatment or
procedures are utilized for his own medical care, so long as the exercise of
this right does not result in death of a patient or fetus not in a Terminal
Condition. No patient may utilize this right to force any Health Care Pro-
vider to utilize any medical treatment or procedure which that Health Care
Provider does not condone.
B. Every adult person has the right to execute a Declaration concerning
decisions to be made with respect to his own medical treatment, which Dec-
laration will be effective at any time such patient is a Qualified Patient as
defined in Section 1.
Section 3. Execution of Declaration
A. Every adult person has the right to execute a Declaration concerning
what medical treatment or procedures are to be utilized or withheld for his
medical care in the event that person becomes a Qualified Patient as de-
fined in Section 1. To be effective, a Declaration must be in writing, and
signed by the declarant or by another person in the declarant's presence
and by the declarant's expressed direction if the declarant is unable to sign
his name. The declaration must also be signed by two witnesses eighteen
(18) years of age or older. Such witnesses cannot be (i) the person who
signed the declaration on behalf of the declarant, (ii) entitled to any portion
of the estate of the declarant according to the laws of intestate succession of
this state or under any will of the declarant, or (iii) directly financially re-
sponsible for the declarant's medical care.
B. A physician who has been given a copy of a Declaration shall have the
right to presume the validity of that Declaration, and act in accordance with
the Declaration, unless he has knowledge of facts indicating that the Decla-
ration is not valid or effective.
C. A Declaration in the following form, whether or not it contains both of
the paragraphs numbered 1 and 2 below, shall be deemed valid, if signed
and witnessed in accordance with this Section.
DECLARATION CONCERNING MEDICAL TREATMENT
This Declaration is made this day of , . I, , willfully and voluntarily
appoint , my , as my agent and attorney-in-fact, without right of substitu-
tion, with lawful authority to make any decisions concerning my medical
treatment that I would have the right to determine, at any time that I am
physically unable to communicate such decisions or am INCOMPETENT
or unconscious.
If I am diagnosed as having a terminal condition, so that my attending
physician and one other physician who has personally examined me deter-
mine that there is no reasonable expectation that my condition will improve
and that such condition will imminently result in my death, I direct that all
medical procedures which my attending physician deems would achieve no
goal other than prolonging the dying process, be withheld or withdrawn.
This paragraph shall supersede any directions made by an attorney-in-fact
for me, if there is a conflict between this paragraph and such directions.
I understand the full import of this Declaration, and I am mentally com-








D. Notwithstanding anything herein to the contrary, no patient may re-
quire by means of a Declaration, and no attorney-in-fact appointed by a
Declaration may require on behalf of a patient, any medical treatment, care,
or inaction which endangers the life of a patient not in a terminal condition
or endangers the life of a fetus.
Section 4. Revocation of Declaration
A. A Declaration may be revoked at any time by the declarant:
1. By means of a signed dated writing expressly superseding or revoking
the Declaration;
2. By physical cancellation or destruction of the Declaration by the de-
clarant or by another in the declarant's presence and at the declarant's di-
rection; or
3. By means of an oral expression of intent to revoke.
B. Any such revocation is immediately effective. Nevertheless, no person
shall be held liable for any action taken based on a good faith belief that a
Declaration was still in effect, unless that person has actual knowledge of
such revocation.
Section 5. Responsibility of Physicians and Health Care Providers
A. Each Health Care Provider shall honor all medical treatment decisions
made by a patient to the extent permitted by Section 2 above. If a patient is
a Qualified Patient, the Health Care Provider shall honor the patient's Dec-
laration, including honoring the treatment decisions of one appointed as at-
torney-in-fact for the patient pursuant to a Declaration.
B. Notwithstanding anything herein to the contrary, no Health Care Pro-
vider shall be required to:
1. If the Health Provider is an individual, do any act or refrain form doing
any act which is contrary to the dictates of that person's conscience; and
2. If the Health Care Provider is an institution, permit any action or any
inaction for any patient being treated by the Health Care Provider which is
contrary to the written by-laws or regulations of that Health Care Provider.
C. If any Health Care Provider is aware that a patient has executed a
Declaration, and that the dictates of that Declaration may be contrary to
the Health Care Provider's conscience, by-laws or regulations as set forth in
Section 5B, that Health Care Provider shall immediately notify the patient,
if possible, and the patient's immediate family that the Health Care Pro-
vider may be unwilling to comply with the Declaration. The Health Pro-
vider shall then utilize its best efforts to effectuate the transfer of the pa-
tient to another Health Provider chosen by:
1. The patient, if the patient is able to communicate the name of the
Health Care Provider to which he wants to be transferred;
2. The attorney-in-fact for the patient, if the patient is unable to commu-
nicate and the patient's Declaration appoints an attorney-in-fact; or
3. The immediate family of the patient, if the patient is unable to com-
municate and no attorney-in-fact has been appointed. The Health Care
Provider shall, in addition to using its best efforts to so transfer the patient,
transfer all medical records in its possession concerning the patient to the
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new Health Care Provider.
D. As soon as any attending physician determines that a patient is in a
terminal condition, that physician shall request that another physician per-
sonally examine the patient. If that second physician concurs with the de-
termination of a terminal condition, both physicians shall immediately rec-
ord in the patient's medical records their determination that the patient is
in a terminal condition.
E. Failure of any Health Care Provider to comply with the requirements
of this statute shall constitute unprofessional conduct.
Section 6. Liability of Health Providers
A. Any Health Care Provider who in good faith participates (sic) in the
withholding or withdrawing of Life-Sustaining Procedures or administers
medical care or treatment:
1. In conformity with a Declaration;
2. In conformity with the express desires of a patient exercising his rights
as set forth in Section 2, hereof; or
3. In conformity with the express desires of the patient's attorney-in-fact
appointed pursuant to a Declaration, shall not be subject to any criminal or
civil liability or penalty as a result thereof and shall not be deemed to have
committed an act of unprofessional conduct thereby.
Section 7. General Provisions
.A. This statute shall create no presumption concerning the intent of an
individual who has not executed a Declaration.
B. Nothing in this statute shall be construed to condone, authorize, ap-
prove or permit any affirmative or deliberate act or omission to end a
human life other than to permit the natural process of dying as provided in
this statute.
C. The withholding or withdrawal of Life-Sustaining Procedures from a
patient in a terminal condition pursuant to that patient's desires as ex-
pressed directly or through a Declaration shall not, for any purpose, consti-
tute suicide, manslaughter, or homicide [and shall not constitute the crime
of assisting suicide].
D. The making of a Declaration shall not affect in any manner the sale,
procurement or issuance of any policy, of life insurance, nor shall it be
deemed to modify the terms of an existing life insurance policy. No policy
of life insurance shall be legally impaired or invalidated in any manner by
the withholding or withdrawal of Life-Sustaining Procedures from a patient
in a terminal condition, notwithstanding any term of the policy to the
contrary.
E. No Health Care Provider or insurer may require any person to execute
a Declaration as a condition for receiving health care services or health
insurance."'
VI. CONCLUSION
In light of the United States Supreme Court's decision in
Cruzan and the federal Self-Determination Act, state statutory law
131. Id at 539-43.
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and case law has assumed a controlling role in a patient's right of
self-determination. 13 2 However, as the foregoing discussion demon-
strates, both the case and statutory law are riddled with confusion.
In addition, the law varies from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. Thus,
patients situated similarly and expressing the same medical desires
may be treated differently depending upon where they ultimately
become hospitalized. Ambiguous definitions and vague statements
granting a health care provider immunity from liability thwart the
very purposes of living will legislation.13 8 Clearly uniformity is
desirable.
The model Medical Treatment Decisions Act is an attempt to
alleviate the deficiencies mentioned in this article. The model act
strives to establish unambiguous definitions.134 Terminal illness
and life-sustaining procedures are defined in terms of the physi-
cian's opinion avoiding the problems associated with terms such as
reasonable judgment."' Further, the act codifies the informed con-
sent doctrine so that qualified persons without living wills are still
able to assert the "right-to-die." 3 6 The model act indicates that
the living will is to become effective only if the patient is unable to
communicate his desires concerning medical treatment.137 There-
fore under the act, a patient while competent should be able to
assert his rights of medical decision-making under the informed
consent doctrine without relying on state case law.
Like some existing legislation the model act specifically provides
for a medical power of attorney. 38 Physicians will be aided by a
power of attorney designating a person to make decisions for the
patient. This is particularly desirable when multiple family mem-
bers disagree on medical procedures for a terminal illness or un-
conscious patient. Finally, the model act, like existing statutory
law, releases a health care provider from civil or criminal liability.
The language of the model act uses carefully worded definitions
which are consistently applied throughout. Therefore, the model
act provides a clear statement exempting a provider from liability
132. See text pages 18-21 accompanying notes and pages 24-28 and accompanying
notes.
133. See text page 28-31 and accompanying notes.
134. See Model Act § 1.
135. Compare Model Act § 1 (D & F) with text page 28-29 and accompanying notes.
136. See Model Act § 2.
137. Model Act § 2(B).
138. See Model Act § 5.
See also, Utah Code and § 75-2-1106 (Supp 1987) permitting a patient to authorize by a
power of attorney to have a third person make treatment decisions for a patient.
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if he acts in good faith on reliance of an advanced directive.""
Consequently, the model act should be enacted but with one ad-
ditional provision. The Medical Treatment Decisions Act does not
provide for those situations when an individual, unable to commu-
nicate his desires, has not made an advanced directive pursuant to
the act. The act should include a provision such as the Utah's Per-
sonal Choice and Living Will Act 40 which provides for this occur-
rence. The act should establish a priority list of persons to be con-
sulted along with the attending physician to make decisions
regarding life-sustaining treatment. No legislation can provide all
the answers. No one can predict where new medical advances will
lead. The model act with the recommended addition should pro-
vide the maximum protection to such a highly personal choice-to
live or to die.
Thomas Rivosecchi
139. See Model Act § 6.
140. Utah Code Ann § 75-2-1107(1-3) (Supp 1987) here the attending physician shall
consult with another physician to confirm a patient is in a terminal condition and then
obtain the consent of persons in the following order:
(i) a legal guardian, or the person's spouse;
(ii) a parent; or
(iii) the person's children 18 years of age or older.
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